Supply Chain | Web Skimming | Client-Side JavaScript | iOS Exploitation
Source Material: Report URI investigation; Optimizely incident notice | Technology: Optimizely Web Experimentation and client-side JavaScript | Targeting: Global, multi-sector websites and their visitors
Executive Summary
On 16 November 2026, an unauthorized party exploited a vulnerability in Optimizely Experimentation to add malicious JavaScript to customer projects. The altered snippets were served from trusted Optimizely infrastructure and executed in visitors’ browsers. Threat investigators identified 188 infected snippets associated with 178 organizations across finance, technology, retail, media, travel, healthcare and other sectors; the observed set is not a complete census.
The browser payload could replace cryptocurrency wallet addresses, capture payment-card data entered into first-party forms, collect non-HttpOnly cookies and page screenshots, and send data to attacker infrastructure. On iPhone and iPad devices, the script also attempted to route selected iOS versions to Coruna, DarkSword and a separate iOS 26 chain. Public reporting confirms cryptocurrency theft, but does not establish how many payment cards, cookies or mobile devices were compromised.
Optimizely states that it fixed the vulnerability, removed the injected code, secured affected accounts and added delivery protections. At 21:52 UTC on 16 November, threat investigators observed 1 of 188 known snippets still infected. Deepwatch experts have observed and escalated activity associated with this campaign in customer environments. Organizations using Optimizely Web should immediately validate every production snippet and Project JavaScript field, block the listed infrastructure, review account and publishing activity, and perform retrospective hunting across web, DNS, proxy, endpoint, CSP and mobile-device telemetry.
Threat Overview and Strategic Impact
The incident is a client-side software supply chain compromise. Optimizely Web customers embed a JavaScript snippet, commonly from cdn.optimizely.com, that includes platform code, experiments and optional customer-controlled Project JavaScript. The attacker inserted a loader into Project JavaScript across unrelated customer projects. Because the trusted CDN delivered the modified snippets with a valid certificate, conventional domain allowlists and controls that trusted the Optimizely origin did not by themselves prevent execution. This was not described as CDN cache poisoning.
Researchers observed the first Optimizely injection at 04:21 UTC on 16 November. The primary attacker-controlled payload host later served a crypto clipper and, from 13:43 UTC, a payment-card skimmer. The script manipulated page content, form fields, links, clipboard operations and outbound browser requests; it also used background browser beacons to transmit card data and context including page URL, accessible cookies, original wallet addresses and a screenshot. Hosted payment fields inside cross-origin provider iframes were outside the reported skimmer’s reach, while cards entered directly into the affected site’s own forms were exposed.
For iOS visitors, the payload fingerprinted device versions and loaded hidden iframe chains from attacker-controlled exploit kit domains. Research linked those paths to Coruna for iOS 13-17, DarkSword for iOS 18.x and a separate iOS 26 path. Delivery does not prove exploitation succeeded and no public confirmation on the count of compromised devices is available.
While direct on-chain cryptocurrency theft totaled approximately $7,040 across BTC, LTC, TRON, ETH, and BSC wallets, this campaign also includes enterprise risks (see Technical Artifacts for specific domains, URL paths, and script indicators):
- Corporate & BYOD iOS Compromise: Affected properties include high-traffic news, travel, and business platforms commonly visited by employees (including BBC, CNN, Fox News, Zoom, Salesforce, GitLab, Smartsheet, Alaska Airlines, and Air France-KLM), as a result, unmanaged or unpatched iPhones and iPads running iOS 18.7.2 or earlier, particularly iOS 18.6 and earlier, where pages reloaded every 60 seconds to retry exploitation, were exposed to Coruna or DarkSword exploit chains. Successful mobile exploitation puts corporate email, MFA authenticators, SSO tokens, and internal messaging at risk. (iOS 18.7.3+ and iOS 26.3+ are patched.)
- Corporate Card Skimming (P-Cards & Procurement): Starting at 13:43 UTC on 16 November, the browser payload monitored form submissions and outbound web requests for Luhn-valid card numbers, expiration dates, and CVVs, exfiltrating captured data to attacker-controlled collection infrastructure. While isolated cross-origin payment iframes (such as Stripe or Adyen) were unaffected, corporate cards entered into first-party checkout or billing forms on infected sites were exposed.
- Session Token & Screenshot Exfiltration: When swapping addresses near wallet or payment terms, the payload exfiltrated accessible session cookies (those lacking the HttpOnly flag) alongside a rendered page screenshot to the collection server. With 32 Banking/Finance organizations (including HSBC, Paychex, Equifax, and ABN AMRO) and 23 Technology/SaaS vendors (including Salesforce, GitLab, Smartsheet, Tableau, and MuleSoft) affected, exposed session identifiers or sensitive portal views create follow-on account takeover risk.
- First-Party Supply-Chain Risk for Optimizely Web Customers: Enterprises running Optimizely Web on customer-facing portals face direct Project JavaScript tampering risk. Even where a Content Security Policy (CSP) restricts external command-and-control domains, the inline loader variant executes directly inside the host page’s trusted execution context if Optimizely’s CDN and dynamic script evaluation are permitted.
The actor remains unattributed. Optimizely confirmed exploitation of an Experimentation vulnerability but has not published a CVE, technical root cause, affected-version range or complete customer list. The principal business risks are theft of payment and cryptocurrency data, session-cookie exposure, mobile-device compromise, fraud, regulatory and PCI response obligations, and erosion of trust in third-party website code.
Security Hardening and Recommendations
Treat any Optimizely Web deployment as requiring validation, not as automatically compromised. Inventory all production and self-hosted Optimizely snippets; compare current Project JavaScript and published snippet content with approved source control or a known-good baseline; remove unauthorized code; and republish only after review. If validation is incomplete, temporarily disable the snippet or restrict delivery on sensitive payment, authentication and cryptocurrency workflows.
Block the listed domains and paths at DNS, secure web gateway, proxy and egress controls. Review Optimizely account users, roles, API credentials, SSO and MFA posture, recent logins, project changes and publishing events; remove unknown access and rotate credentials or tokens with project-write capability. Preserve affected snippets, headers and logs before cleanup.
Identify visitors and staff who accessed affected pages during the observed window and assess exposure based on page function. Engage privacy, legal, fraud and PCI teams where payment, cookie or personal data may have been captured. Require managed Apple devices to run the latest supported iOS/iPadOS release and investigate exposed devices rather than relying on a reboot alone. Strengthen client-side controls with CSP reporting, script-change monitoring and least-privilege connect-src rules; test changes because a trusted dynamic loader can weaken source-based assumptions.
Detection Strategy
Prioritize network evidence from 16 November 2026 onward. Hunt DNS, proxy, secure web gateway and browser telemetry for the domains and URI paths listed in the Technical Artifacts section, especially when the initiating process is a browser or the referrer is an affected site.
For websites, scan present and historical Optimizely snippets and Project JavaScript for references to attacker infrastructure, obfuscated or base64 encoded variants, unexpected dynamic script loaders, inline evaluation fallbacks, and unauthorized screenshot or beacon-based exfiltration routines (see Technical Artifacts for specific indicators). Compare CDN objects and Last-Modified values with known-good baselines. Review CSP violation reports and client-side integrity monitoring for new script origins or unexpected connections.
Correlate matches with user, page and device context. On endpoints and managed mobile devices, investigate unusual browser crashes or repeated page reloads, follow-on processes, downloaded profiles, abnormal authentication after cookie exposure and fraud reports. Absence of an endpoint alert does not exclude browser-only card or clipboard theft.
How Deepwatch Protects Our Customers
Deepwatch has observed and escalated related activity in customer environments, and Deepwatch experts continue to monitor and scope potential exposure by correlating threat-intelligence matches with DNS, proxy, secure web gateway, firewall and endpoint telemetry that is onboarded to the MDR service. Customers should use NEXA Detection Advisor to confirm which relevant detections and data sources are enabled in their environment.
Relevant Detections
Please visit Guardian Platform to access the relevant detections for this activity.
Technical Artifacts
Please visit Guardian Platform to access the associated technical artifacts.
Threat Object Mapping
Intrusion Set:
- Unattributed.
Attack Pattern (MITRE ATT&CK/MITRE ATLAS):
| Tactic | Technique | Technique ID | Associated Threat Activity |
| Initial Access | Compromise Software Supply Chain | T1195.002 | Malicious Project JavaScript was distributed through trusted Optimizely Web snippets loaded by customer sites. |
| Initial Access | Drive-by Compromise | T1189 | A legitimate website visit caused attacker-controlled JavaScript and, for selected iOS versions, hidden exploit-kit iframes to load. |
| Collection / Execution | Input Capture; Clipboard Data; Screen Capture; Exploitation for Client Execution | T1056; T1115; T1113; T1203 | The payload captured form data, clipboard contents and screenshots in the browser; iOS visitors could be routed to exploit chains. |
Vulnerabilities:
- Optimizely Experimentation vulnerability: exploited in the wild, fixed by the vendor, but no CVE, technical root cause or affected-version range was public as of 17 November 2026.
- iOS exploit-chain vulnerabilities: individual CVEs used by Coruna, DarkSword and the observed iOS 26 path were not confirmed in the incident reporting.
Malware/Tool:
- Primary campaign browser payload: cryptocurrency clipper, payment-card skimmer, cookie and screenshot collector.
- Coruna iOS exploit kit.
- DarkSword / P7 DarkSword iOS exploit kit.
- html2canvas (legitimate library abused for page screenshots).
Additional Sources
- Report URI: World’s Largest Brands Infected With Malware Via Optimizely
- Optimizely: Web Experimentation Security Incident
- StepSecurity: OPTIMJACK Technical Analysis
- Optimizely: Account-Level Security Best Practices
- Optimizely: Content Security Policy Guidance
- Apple: Security Releases | MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise Techniques
Share